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Wunschel: Insolvency as a Ground of Equity Jurisdiction in West Virginia

STUDENT NOTES
INSOLVENCY AS A GROUND OF EQUITY JURISDICTION
IN WEST VIRGINIA*
In cases involving trespass to land, the West Virginia court
has both by direct holding' and by dictum2 frequently and consistently asserted that the insolvency of the trespasser will entitle
the plaintiff, upon showing good title3 to an injunction because in
such case that party could have no adequate remedy at law.4 In
order to emphasis insolvency as the jurisdictional factor in these
cases,' it might be pointed out that prior to the case of Pardee v.
Lumber Co.,6 the cutting of timber upon the land of another was
repeatedly held, in this state, to be a mere trespass for which the
law gave adequate compensation in damages 7 and the legal remedy
became inadequate only when the trespasser was insolvent s Thus
it may be argued that the Pardee case definitely establishes insolvency as the jurisdictional factor in those earlier cases,0 and
that it was not a mere make-weight 0 aiding the court in the exThis note is confined to trespass to land and contract cases.
'Watson v. Ferrell, 34 W. Va. 406, 12 S. E. 724 (1890), where the plaintiff failed to allege insolvency; Lloyd v. Blackburn, 57 W. Va. 217, 50 S.E.
741 (1905); Marcum v. Marcum, 57 W. Va. 285, 50 S.E. 246 (1905), but a
mere
2 allegation of insolvency when denied by the defendant must be proven.
McMillan v. Ferrell, 7 W. Va. 223 (1874); Western M. and M. Co. v.
Virginia Channel Coal Co., 10 W. Va. 250 (1877); Cox v. Douglass, 20 V.
Va. 175 (1882); Cresap v. Kemble, 26 W. Va. 603 (1885); Hanley v. Watterson, 39 W. Va. 214, 19 S. E. 536 (1894); Bettman v. Harness, 42 W. Va.
433, 26 S. E. 271 (1896); Fluharty v. Mills, 49 W. Va. 446, 38 S. E. 521
(1901); Stevenson & Coon v. Burdett, 56 W. Va. 109, 48 S.E. 846 (1904).
8 Western M. & M. Co. v. Virginia Channel Coal Co., supra n. 2. The bill
is fatally defective if it does not aver good title in the plaintiff.
4Lloyd v. Blackburn; Marcum v. Marcum, supra n. 1. Insolvency makes
the cutting of timber an irreparable injury.
5
Supra n. 1.
670 W. Va. 68, 73 S. E. 82 (1911). Accord: Kunst v. Mabie, 72 W. Va.
201, 77 S.E. 987 (1913); Stybr v. Lumber Co., 110 W. Va. 337, 158 S. E.
669 (1931).
McMillan v. Ferrell, supra n. 2. Speaking of a wrongful cutting of timber the court said "In ordinary cases the damages to be assessed by a jury,
will be adequate for a check, and for a recompense especially if the trespasser is not insolvent"y; Stevenson & Coon v. Burdett, supra n. 2.
s upra nn. 1 and 2.

9 Supra n. 1.
10 WALsH oN EQu= (1930) § 63. Walsh says that in nearly all, if not
all cases discussed in which equity has intervened to restrain torts the insolvency of the defendant seems to have been a mere makeweight argument
appealing to the discretion of the court, but other reasons existed which
justified equitable relief. "Surely it has never been seriously contended
that equity will restrain a wrongdoer from a threatened wrong merely because
the defendant could not satisfy a judgment that might be recovered against

him2'.
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ercise of its discretionary power to grant or deny an injunction."
On the other hand insolvency as the jurisdictional factor may be
opposed by showing that in each of those cases' 2 a repeated trespass was threatened 3 and while as a general rule equity will not
enjoin a mere naked trespass to realty, yet if the acts are repeated and continuous, even though the party has a right to sue
at law after each offense, equity may take jurisdiction to prevent
a multiplicity of suits. 4 What the court may do in a future case
involving a single threatened trespass' where the defendant is
insolvent, therefore, seems questionable. It might conceivably
adopt the latter approach and deny relief upon the theory that
insolvency alone is not enough in the absence of the other jurisdictional element, a continuous trespass. However, it is submitted
that this ground of jurisdiction was not an operative fact before
the court and that any distinction between single and continuous
acts was either overlooked or disregarded and that the right to
take jurisdiction was based solely upon insolvency. 16
The position of our court with respect to insolvency as a
ground for equitable intervention in contract cases may be fairly
accurately ascertained by a review of the following cases.
In
Warren v. Coal Co." the court unmistakably held, that in the absence of any other equitable features, the mere accident of the
defendant's insolvency will not entitle the plaintiff to specific performance of a contract or to an injunction. The earlier case of
Knott v. Manufacturing 0Co." in denying relief against an insolvent defendant, held, that in determining the adequacy of the legal
remedy the solvency or insolvency of the defendant is immaterial,
for the rule of law is the same in either case. Nevertheless there
is much dicta to the contrary" and Hogg v. McGuffin,20 often
IIClayborn v. Camilla Coal Co., 128 Va. 383, 105 S. E. 117 (1921).
12 Supra n. 1.
13 In the majority of these cases the trespass involved consisted of the
cutting and removal of timber, or other continuous acts such as the drilling
of an oil well.
14 Bennet v. Barnes, 72 W. Va. 161, 78 S. E. 374 (1913).
15' Where the injury is not permanent, this appears to be the test. Obviously
if the single act is completed equity is as incapable of giving adequate relief
against an insolvent defendant as is a court of law.
16 Supra 1. 1.
17 85 W. Va. 684, 102 S. E. 672 (1920).
18 30 W. Va. 790, 5 S. E. 266 (1888).
19 Renick v. Renick, 5 W. Va. 285 (1872) ; Annon v. Brown, 65 W. Va. 34,
63 S. E. 691 (1909); Morgan v. Bartlett, 75 W. Va. 293, 83 S. B. 1001
(1914); Williams v. McCarty, 82 W. Va. 158, 95 S. E. 638 (1918).
20 67 W. Va. 456, 68 S. E. 41 (1910).
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cited as an authority for this position,21 appears to be merely dictum also since it involves a basis for jurisdiction apart from the
insolvency of the defendant. The suit concerned shares of stock
in a "close corporation". 22 It may be concluded that in cases of
contract in this state, the insolvency of the defendant alone will
not entitle the plaintiff to relief in equity.
It is self-evident that a judgment at law against an executionproof defendant is not an adequate remedy,.2 3 all formalistic reasoning to the contrary 24 notwithstanding. The rendition of a
judgment is often a step only in the process of granting relief on
a legal claim, which is not completed until execution issues and
quite often not until suggestion proceedings are had against a third
party holding debts or property due the judgment debtor. Thus,
to say the law has adequately served the plaintiff by the rendition
of a judgment is to disregard this subsequent phase of the remedial
process entirely and to substitute vindication for compensation.
The principle arguments against insolvency as a ground of equity
jurisdiction present no insurmountable objection. That "such a
doctrine would turn over to equity all actions at law for damages
where this financial condition of the defendant could be established whether in tort or in contract ' ' 2 is not a necessary consequence, 26 and if it were, would not be a sufficient reason to deny
21 Williams v. McCarty; Morgan v. Bartlett, supra n. 19.

22 The syllabus, however, complicates matters by enumerating in the disjunctive several conditions, one of which is the insolvency of the defendant,
which will entitle the plaintiff to specific performance of a contract for an
exchange of shares of stock, and the syllabus is sometimes said to be the
law of the case in this state. Kuhn v. Coal Co., 215 U. S. 349, 30 S. Ct. 140
(1910); State v. Pell Splint Co., 36 W. Va. 802, 15 S. E. 1000 (1892).
23 Horack, Insolvency and Specific Performance (1918) 31 HAnv. L. REV.
702, 703. "The proper test of the adequacy of the legal remedy in any case
is, whether the plaintiff can take the sum of money recovered, and with it
put himself in the same situation as if the contract had been kept."
24Knott v. Manufacturing Co., supra n. 18. "It
may be said that this
remedy is inadequate by reason of the insolvency of the company, but the
reply to this objection is that courts do not provide the means to pay debts
but only the means of enforcing their payment. Whether the debtor is
solvent or insolvent is immaterial. The rules of law are the same in either
case."
25 WALSH, op. cit. supra n. 10.
26 M Clintock, Adequacy of Ineffective Bemedy at Law (1932) 16 MINN L.
REV. 233, 255. "Not many of the torts for which redress is not already
sought in equity could be prevented by injunction. Obviously an injunction
could ordinarily be obtained only where a continuing or a repeated tort was
involved," or where a single tort was threatened. Obviously also where the
payment of money is alone the reason for the suit, relief in equity, where
the defendant is insolvent, is as ineffectual as is the remedy at law. Of.
Morgan v. Bartlett, supra n. 19. Where a vendor sought specific performance
of a contract to sell land.
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adequate relief upon a just debt or claim. That such a doctrine
would be inequitable in contract eases in that it would create a
preference in favor of one creditor of the insolvent over others,2'
may be prevented by the exercise of sound discretion by the court
as is done in numerous other instances where equity properly has
jurisdiction." Whether such a doctrine would be more justifiable
in tort cases due to the absence of the conscnsual relationship or
in contract cases because the defendant cannot in fairness object
to a decree which requires him to perform his obligation 9 is of
little importance once it becomes established that the legal remedy
against an insolvent defendant is inadequate.30
-WuLm

F. WuNSscH.

2

7Warren Co. v. Black Coal Co., supra n. 17.
2SHorack, op. cit. supra n. 23, at 706. " Though the jurisdiction of the
court may be perfect, equity in many situations very properly refuses to
exercise it and on this basis specific performance should not be given to one
creditor in his suit against an insolvent defendant when such relief would
result to the prejudice of other creditors occupying similar positions and
who
2 are equally entitled to relief."
0 WMASH, op. cit. supra n. 10.
30McClintock, op. cit. supra n. 26, at 235. "No reason appears why the
test of inadequacy should be different in the two cases, nor is it apparent
why judgment for damages against an insolvent is not as glaringly insufficient as a remedy where it is given for the breach of the contract as when
it is given for a trespass."
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